Analysis: CUSB v Clapham, EUCF Final 2019 by Brummie

Precise throwing

CUSB’s individual skill level is very high; they have precise inside breaks, set up their cuts well, and looked comfortable working at a high intensity. In particular, the wide & low pivots of the Italian side were able to make a mockery of some static marks, allowing them to move the disc with ease in any direction.

Drill this: Around Throw to Lateral Cut

CUSB also punished Clapham’s zone, using fast, accurate passes to cut through the middle, then quickly shifting downfield. Clapham were often chasing shadows because CUSB were taking on throws that Clapham just didn’t expect them to be able to hit with any reliability. When your game plan is to force accurate throws into narrow windows – and the opposition is hitting them with ease – then you need to go back to the drawing board.

CUSB were very comfortable playing small ball and working in tight spaces.

CUSB did a great job of using their cutters to churn up yards, then as they approached the end zone they seemed to prefer looking at the cutters closest to the disc instead; watch this clip below (we’ll come back to look at this again later).

I’m a big fan of this type of movement immediately after a call, a throw to space that’s undefended away from the stack. Also note the scoring cut — the cutter runs directly towards the disc, sealing the lane from his defender. With the marker peeling off to prevent open side continuation, it becomes easy for the cutter to make a last minute move to the break side for an easy goal.

Drill this: Diagonal Lead Pass

Poaching and Switching

CUSB played some zone defence (which we’ll discuss later), but largely relied upon their individual defensive skills, sticking like glue to Clapham and making it tough for the Londoners to get open.

However, CUSB did use some poaching and double-teaming, and when it happened it was decisive, and they had a game plan on how to recover, with other defenders adjusting to contain the poached offensive player. This kind of team-wide understanding leaves defenders with the confidence to go and make a play if they see an opportunity. While Bruno Mine came up short with this attempt, these are the kinds of bids that leave an offence constantly fearing that they’re about to throw to a poach.

Three defenders all work together to prevent goal here: note particularly what happens when the disc first moves forwards; there is a 1-on-1 match up in the endzone, and the CUSB defender chooses to ignore the cutter and move in to apply a mark, trusting that a team mate will take over his assignment. Applying a mark allows him to slow Clapham down, and another defender comes in to get the block.

Clapham also showed some excellent switching, particularly in the handler space; here there’s a three-way switch around the disc:

But it was as though the entire team wasn’t on board. When things go wrong, it’s often the case that the team structure starts to disintegrate. Look at this example: a Clapham defender sees a poach opportunity and peels off to cover a cutter. But no-one covers for him, and CUSB quickly hit the poached player with a hammer. The poach catches up, contains the break, then moves in on the mark. All good so far. But then, when there are two defenders surrounding the thrower, he inexplicably runs away, leaving the marker out of position & allowing an easy goal to the break side.

CUSB did an excellent job at attacking all areas of the field, exposing weaknesses in Clapham’s defensive coverage using multiple cutters. In contrast, Clapham seemed to rely on one person being able to get open, which CUSB found it easier to stop with good defensive positioning and active marks. One possibility could be that Clapham’s offence is built solid principles of using space; if another cutter is in that space, then it should be avoided. CUSB instead seem to work upon the principle of manipulating their defender and taking what options are available; if you watch the game you’ll see many instances where CUSB cutters are attacking the same space at the same time. Clapham’s defence just wasn’t expecting it.

Japanese inspired offence

Take another look at the clip above, particularly the two passes after the hammer; a cut comes from the open side laterally to the break side, one after another.

Watch this clip of Japan v Colombia 2016; notice the pattern as follows:

1. Catch and look for an around break
2. If that option isn’t there – because the marker has committed to preventing it – then step forwards into the created space to throw continuation to another cutter
3. Repeat

Now watch this clip of CUSB in action:

It’s a clever offensive system called Cyclone, using Multiple Offset Lateral Cuts coming from the open side towards the break side. I’ve seen Revolver use these principles too, but this is the first time I’ve seen a European club employ them. One key aspect is the isolation of cutters near the disc on the open side, timing their movements in response to what the thrower looks for. If their defender is stood to defend the open side, then they won’t be able to contest these kinds of lateral cuts.

By the way, if the defender guarding this isolated cutter isn’t guarding the open side, then CUSB have ways and means of abusing that:

Drill this: Diagonal Lead Pass

Or simply hitting the open side under when the defenders over-commit to stopping this break side movement.

Here’s another example – you can see the cuts develop and the handlers going through the motion of looking to break around, then inside – although in this instance CUSB opt to dump instead.

Drill this: Offset Lateral Cut

This is the beauty of a well-designed offence; defenders are forced to give up one option, and the offence is more than happy to take it. In combination with some patience recycling the disc, it proved to be difficult for a team relying on their 1-on-1 defence to beat.

More examples and details on the ‘Cyclone’ offence: Timing multiple options

“Assassin” Zone

Saving the best for last: the zone that left Clapham with nowhere to go, eventually Clapham resorting to throwing huge overheads because those were the only options available. So what exactly were CUSB doing, and why was it so effective?

Let’s start by taking a long look at the zone in action:

1. The “assassin”

Pay particular attention to the Clapham handler towards the top of the screen at the start of the clip, James Freeman. He is tightly guarded throughout the point, and only when he goes long does his defender ditch him to pick up a swing handler instead. He’s the target of the “assassin”. CUSB assigned one defender to guard a key Clapham handler – usually James Mead or James Freeman. Both of these handlers are well-known for their dynamic handler movement, and assigning them a very tight defender – the “assassin” – effectively prevents them getting involved. Essentially: guard one of the key handlers 1-on-1, and play 6v6 zone with the rest. It’s an old tactic, and one I’ve not seen deployed at this level for a long time. One reason I think it was particularly successful here was that the player chosen for “assassination” was a swing handler, not the central handler, so they never got the disc and instead just ended up blocking space. If you’re playing zone offence you will want options to swing in both directions; removing one of these caused Clapham difficulties.

2 x handler markers

Of the remaining six defenders, two acted as handler marks, predominantly forcing middle to choke throwing lanes. They played loose at the start of the stall, tightening up as the stall rose – just as Clapham started ignoring their downfield options to look at their resets. This in turn led to Clapham taking some tough reset throws near the back of their own endzone, and as the pressure rose, some errors were made; note here that Freeman again is being guarded closely.

Watch how the handler mark peels off to stop continuation when the disc swings, and then guards the reset very tightly when the thrower starts looking to reset as the stall gets higher.

Diamond behind

Behind, a diamond consisting of one “middle”, two wings and a deep. The wings were tasked with cutting off downfield movement by shifting laterally, and the middle moves forwards and backwards to cut off throwing lanes in the same way; see this first turnover from Clapham, where the wing comes in from the side, who then switches with the middle, leading to a miscommunication error between Clapham’s handlers.

Below we see how the zone shifts when the disc moves to the sideline, with the wing, middle & handler marker forming a triangle to surround the disc. At the end of the clip, you can see how the deep & wing switch to contain cutters.

Clapham never really worked out a way to dissect the zone, relying instead on longer throws over the top. While this worked at times, it was also the the cause of one of the first blocks in the game; watch the wing drop as Clapham push through the zone, then come back to attack the hanging disc:

CUSB didn’t play their zone very often, and never on consecutive points, so Clapham never got the chance to get to grips with it during the game.